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The Bituminous coal strike of 1977–1978 was a 110-day national coal strike in the United States led by the United Mine Workers of America, AFL-CIO. It began December 6, 1977, and ended on March 19, 1978. It is generally considered a successful union strike, although the contract was not beneficial to union members. Since the 1940s, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) had negotiated a nationwide National Coal Wage Agreement with the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA), a group of large coal mine operators. The three-year agreements covered national bargaining issues such as wages, health and pension benefits, workplace health and safety, and work rules. Local agreements, far more limited in scope, were negotiated by each individual local affiliate of UMWA. ==Causes of the strike== UMWA president Arnold Miller had negotiated the previous collective bargaining agreement in during the Bituminous Coal Strike of 1974. The right of local unions to strike—not wages—was the primary issue in the negotiations. In the 1930s and 1940s, destructive competition drove coal operators to cut prices so drastically that many went into bankruptcy. Many producers slashed wages drastically to survive. From the workers' perspective, this was bad enough. During the Great Depression, however, wages needed to be kept high in order to stimulate demand. UMWA and other unions took advantage of the depression by offering industry-wide, national collective bargaining agreements as a way to stabilize wages. Not only would wages remain high, but producers' costs would now also stabilize and remove—to a great extent—producers' ability to fund destructive competition through wage decreases. In return, UMWA and other unions agreed to "labor peace." In UMWA's case, this meant stripping local unions of the right to strike without the international union's approval. But wildcat strikes had become common in the coal industry. UMWA miners grew frustrated with the poor terms of national contracts and employer foot-dragging on dispute resolution and grievances. Democratic reforms within the Mine Workers and an excellent 1974 contract had not released the pressure which caused wildcat strikes. The solution, as miners saw it, was power. And power flowed from the right to strike over local conditions. Absent the right to strike, UMWA's democracy movement rejected labor peace and wildcat strikes had become even more common. Miller had been forced to accept the right to strike over local conditions in order to win re-election in June 1977. When national bargaining talks opened in the fall, Miller therefore insisted on changing the national collective bargaining agreement to give each UMWA affiliate the limited right to strike over local issues. Miller turned the "labor peace" argument on its head by arguing that the only way to suppress wildcat strikes was to regulate the process and give local unions the right to strike. With the power that the ability to strike would give local unions, local mine operators would no longer create the conditions which led to strikes. But the owners rejected Miller's demand. They had seen how he was unable to bring wildcat strikers back to the bargaining table and they had little faith that his proposal would work. Instead, they demanded the right to fire wildcat strikers and fine any miner who refused to cross wildcat picket lines.〔Krohe, "The UMW Battlefield Moves Beyond the Coal Field," ''Illinois Issues'', April 1980; "Striking out of Weakness?" ''Time,'' October 24, 1977.〕〔"The Coal Miners Walk Out," ''Time,'' December 12, 1977.〕 UMWA's negotiating position was not an enviable one, however. Power utilities had built up a 120-day supply of coal, while iron and steel producers had a 75-day supply. Both were more than sufficient to weather a miners' strike. Additionally, the number of coal mines controlled by UMWA had fallen from 67 percent to 50 percent since 1974, leaving more mines in operation to supply national needs during a strike.〔"No Peace in the Pits," ''Time,'' June 27, 1977.〕 The oil crisis which had powered the 1974 round of bargaining no longer existed, and coal demand was lower.〔Navarro, "Union Bargaining Power in the Coal Industry, 1945-1981," ''Industrial and Labor Relations Review,'' January 1983.〕 Miller had also hurt himself. He had fired most of his supporters in the intervening three years, including press officer Bernard Aronson,〔"No Peace in the Pits," ''Time,'' June 27, 1977. He was ostensibly fired for insubordination.〕 research director Thomas Bethell〔"Turmoil in the UMW," ''Business Week,'' January 31, 1977.〕 and most of the research department staff, leaving UMWA organizationally unable to handle the needs of the negotiations and strike. Miller turned to the Stanley Ruttenberg Company for negotiating advice and assistance at the bargaining table. This caused confusion among UMWA negotiators as to strategy, tactics and the content of proposals, and caused mixed signals to be sent by the bargaining committee, Miller and other UMWA officers. The lack of organizational competence and flow of mixed messages helped prolong the labor dispute.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Bituminous coal strike of 1977–1978」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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